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I. STATUS
A. SAME-SEX UNIONS
AME-SEX unions, whether formal or informal, are unrecognized
under Texas law.' Nevertheless, from late 2009 through the winter
of 2010, Texas appellate courts dealt with disputes concerning same-
sex marriages recognized by other states and their proprietary conse-
quences. Of these cases, State v. Naylor dealt with the proprietary aspects
* B.A., University of Texas, BA., M.A., B.C.L., Oxford University, L.L.M., Colum-
bia University. Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University of Dallas, Texas.
I am very grateful for the very capable assistance of my student assistant Benjamin
Muro, without whose help this survey mostly covering appellate disputes for nearly two
years could not have been so successfully completed. Additional thanks go to Margaret
O'Connor, Emily Walker, and Natalie Paul for their assistance in preparing this article.
1. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.001(b) (West 2006). (Persons of the same sex may
not be issued a license for a ceremonial marriage but an informal marriage may be con-
tracted by a man and a woman. Id. § 2.401(a).
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of divorce proceedings involving a same-sex couple. 2
B. INFORMAL MARRIAGE
In Smith v. Deneve,3 the Dallas Court of Appeals was concerned with
issues involving informal marriage and a constructive trust.4 The alleged
husband sued for divorce after a relationship lasting fourteen years (dur-
ing which time the couple lived together) and the alleged wife took title
to a home and boat in her name only.5 The trial court granted summary
judgment for the alleged wife on the ground that no marriage ever ex-
isted between the couple.6
The court of appeals concluded that the alleged husband did not offer
sufficient evidence that he and his alleged wife had represented to others
in Texas that they were married, and thus they did not demonstrate pub-
licly that they were married to each other.7 Occasional references to each
other in public as "husband" and "wife" were not enough.8 The court of
appeals compared the evidence in this case to that in Danna v. Danna,9
where the Dallas Court of Appeals found no informal marriage between
a couple who have held themselves out as married only four times over a
period of approximately two years.10 Representations of marriage must
be consistent in order to raise a genuine issue of fact.1 Based on the
evidence, and in light of the holding in Danna, the court of appeals con-
cluded that the "holding out requirement" had not been met by merely
offering as evidence a few instances in which the parties allegedly re-
ferred to each other as husband and wife.' 2 The court of appeals further
held that instances when the couple is listed as "husband" and "wife"
must be supported by evidence that both parties were aware that the
marital representation was being made. 13 Moreover, there was no evi-
dence that anyone in the community was shown those contractual repre-
sentations. 14 Although the alleged husband asserted the existence of a
constructive trust based on an informal relationship, the trial court re-
jected this as showing an informal marriage.1 5 The court of appeals af-
firmed that conclusion.1 6 The husband failed to show evidence that he
2. State v. Naylor, No. 03-10-00237-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 166, at *1-3 (Tex.
App.-Austin Jan. 7, 2011, pet. filed).
3. Smith v. Deneve, 285 S.W.3d 904, 909, 911 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.).
4. Id. at 908.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 908-09.
7. Id. at 910.
8. Id.
9. Danna v. Danna, No. 05-05-00472-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 2368, at *3 (Tex.
App.-Dallas Mar. 29, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.).
10. Id. at *5.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at *4.
14. Id. at *5.
15. Smith v. Deneve, 285 S.W.3d 909, 910-11 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.).
16. Id.
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was at any time guided by the alleged wife's financial judgment and ad-
vice or that she had otherwise assumed the role of a fiduciary. 17 Al-
though he offered evidence that they both contributed to household
expenses, the court of appeals found that such evidence did not necessa-
rily show that the husband had placed any trust in his alleged wife or that
such evidence was consistent with an agreement to share living ex-
penses. 18 As the husband had not entrusted his alleged wife with his fi-
nancial affairs, the court of appeals concluded that the couple's
longstanding cohabital relationship simply did not give rise to an informal
union and duty between them.19
II. CHARACTERIZATION
A. PARTITIONS AND EXCHANGES
In Martin v. Martin, the wife appealed the trial court's grant of sum-
mary judgment for the husband with respect to interpretation and en-
forcement of their marital pre-agreement entered into between the
parties. 20 At trial, the wife testified that prior to signing the agreement,
the husband had assured her that he would never use the agreement
against her and that it was needed "solely to protect the family" from
possible financial ruin as a result of the husband's bad business judg-
ment.2' Because of his constant assertions that unless she signed the
agreement the family would be financially ruined, the wife sought the
legal counsel of a neighbor who reluctantly assisted her in signing it in
1990.22 In the 2003 divorce proceeding that followed, the wife asserted
that the agreement was unconscionable and that she did not sign it volun-
tarily. 23 The trial court nevertheless granted summary judgment in the
husband's favor without stating the basis for its ruling and held the agree-
ment valid and enforceable. 24 Based on the alleged threats of "financial
ruin," and because the wife's previous attorney testified that "obvious
pressure was.., placed on [her]" to sign the agreement, the Dallas Court
of Appeals found that the ex-wife had produced more than a scintilla of
evidence to raise an issue of fact.25 This precluded judgment as a matter
of law on the wife's statutory defense of involuntary execution of the
agreement. 26 Thus, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court
had erred in granting the husband's no-evidence motion for summary
judgment. 27
17. Id. at 912.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Martin v. Martin, 287 S.W.3d 260, 261 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, pet. denied).
21. Id. at 264.
22. Id. at 264-65.
23. Id. at 261-62.
24. Id. at 265.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 263.
27. Id. at 264-65 (internal quotations omitted).
20111
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In Martin, the wife also asserted that the husband was guilty of fraud
on the community estate under the marital property agreement. 28 The
husband's motion for summary judgment seeking to enforce the agree-
ment was nevertheless granted by the trial court.29 The appellate court
went on to say that the statute of limitations for ordinary fraud does not
apply to a claim of "fraud on the community" in a divorce proceeding
when the party asserting the fraud-defense claims it is a result of an obli-
gation induced by fraud.30 In Martin, subsequent to signing the marital
agreement partitioning and exchanging the couple's assets, the wife pro-
duced financial documents purporting to show valuations of the hus-
band's assets that were drastically different from those recited in the
agreement. 31 In the 2003 divorce action, the wife asserted the statutory
common-law affirmative defenses available under the statute for marital
property agreements executed prior to September 1, 1993, which included
fraud and fraudulent inducement. 32 On appeal, the husband asserted that
the trial court had properly granted his motion for summary judgment
because the wife was precluded by the statute of limitations from assert-
ing fraud on the community.33 However, since a claim of fraud against
the community "may not be asserted as an independent tort cause of ac-
tion . . . it must be litigated as part of a "just and right division" of the
community property upon divorce. '34 Thus, until the husband asserted
the agreement against her in the divorce proceeding, the ex-wife's claim
"for fraud on the community was not ripe."' 35 Furthermore, the ex-wife
was not precluded by the statute of limitations from asserting fraud as a
defense to enforcement of the agreement. 36 The statute of limitations
does not apply to a fraud claim pleaded defensively to defeat liability of
an obligation induced by fraud. 37
In In re Noonan, the wife alleged that her husband had "committed
fraud because he was only able to obtain her signature on the postnuptial
agreement by overcoming her free will, and this post-nuptial agreement
thus became an agreement incident to divorce. ' 38 The couple was mar-
ried in 1973 and executed the agreement in 2001. 39 In January 2003, the
husband filed for divorce, and an agreed decree (which included an
agreement incident to divorce) was entered at the final hearing on March
17, 2003.40 Subsequently, the ex-wife filed her first bill of review in No-
vember 2003; non-suited it in January 2004; and "[o]n July 30, 2004, Lori
28. Id. at 266.
29. Id. at 261.
30. Id. at 266.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 261.





38. In re Noonan, 280 S.W.3d 339, 343 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2008, pet. ref'd).
39. Id. at 341.
40. Id.
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and Thomas filed an informal marriage registration. '41 However, "[i]n
June 2005, Lori filed a petition for divorce. '42 After the trial court for the
second divorce entered a partial summary judgment against Lori on mat-
ters regarding the property of the parties, Lori filed her second bill of
review attacking the first divorce decree agreed to by the parties in No-
vember of 2003.43 The wife argued that the agreement incident to di-
vorce and the portion of the judgment which incorporated the agreement
should be set aside because the agreement was procured by fraud.44 She
further requested a new division of the property previously divided in the
original decree.45 The wife's bill of review was dismissed by summary
judgment and she appealed. 46 Mere assertion of a community estate pre-
supposes a marriage, which, in this instance, was denied.
On appeal she alleged that her husband committed fraud by forcing her
to sign the postnuptial agreement. 47 Because the agreement became an
agreement incident to divorce that was embodied in the final divorce de-
cree, she argued that the decree should be set aside and a new division of
marital property should be made.48 However, all of the evidence
presented to show that coercion and duress were used to overcome her
free will pertained to events that occurred during the marriage, prior to
the first divorce in 2003, and dealt with the original postnuptial agree-
ment.49 In particular, the record reflected that at the final hearing for
divorce, the wife's attorney acknowledged communications he had made
with his client concerning a possible defense to the postnuptial agreement
in order to provide her with a fair property division.50 Consequently, the
Amarillo Court of Appeals found that these issues could have been
presented to the trial court,51 and that at best the evidence showed "in-
trinsic fraud and would not support a bill of review."' 52 When relying on
fraud to attack a judgment in a bill of review, a petitioner must rely on
extrinsic fraud.53 "Extrinsic fraud is fraud that denied a party the oppor-
tunity to fully litigate at trial all the rights or defenses that could have
been asserted. Intrinsic fraud, by contrast, relates to the merits of the
issues that were presented. '54 The court of appeals stated that because
intrinsic fraud includes such matters as fraudulent instruments and per-




44. Id. at 341-42.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 341.
47. Id. at 343.
48. Id. at 341.
49. Id. at 344.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 343.
52. Id.
53. Id. (citing Tice v. City of Pasadena, 767 S.W.2d 700, 702 (Tex. 1989)).




ings on issues directly presented, because issues underlying the judgment
"have no probative value on the fraud necessary to a bill of review."'56
Finally, the wife alleged that her husband's threats to exhaust all availa-
ble money on attorney's fees, if she fought the divorce, overcame her free
will.57 Again, however, the events she complained of occurred prior to
the entry of the original decree issued in 2003. The court of appeals
found it hard to believe that the wife's will was so overwhelmed that she
felt unable to bring this issue to light while participating in the trial.58
The court of appeals concluded that she had presented "nothing more
than allegations that the decree of divorce provided an inequitable and
unfair division of the marital estate."'59 Such an "injustice in a final order
will not support relief for a party by a bill of review."'60
B. REIMBURSEMENT AND ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION
1. Reimbursement
In Phillips v. Phillips, the El Paso Court of Appeals laid out, in pains-
taking detail, the reasons for the husband's entitlement to an offset from
his wife's judgment for constructive fraud.61 At trial, the wife prevailed
on a constructive fraud claim alleging that the husband had committed
economic torts against the community estate.62 The wife recovered a re-
imbursement claim of over $400,000 but appealed the award for a quan-
tity over that amount.63 She asserted that, based on the jury's findings,
the husband was not entitled to reimbursement, and alternatively that he
was judicially estopped from asserting his reimbursement claims because
he had admitted judicially that he was not seeking reimbursement. 64
Although treating his right of reimbursement as an offset against a
right of reimbursement is not ordinarily an element of a reimbursement
claim, the court of appeals granted the husband's request as allowed by
the trial court as tried by consent. 65 The husband had offered evidence in
support of his reimbursement claims while informing the jury that he did
not want his wife to reimburse him for the claims. 66 Instead, he sought a
credit against any reimbursement awarded to his wife.67
The couple in Knight v. Knight had entered into an informal marriage
in 1994.68 On appeal, the former wife contended that the trial court's





61. Phillips v. Phillips, 296 S.W.3d 656, 662 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2009, pet. denied).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 663.
65. Id. at 667.
66. Id. at 664.
67. Id.
68. Knight v. Knight, 301 S.W.3d 723, 725 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no
pet.).
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division of the community estate constituted an abuse of discretion be-
cause the trial court erroneously refused to grant her reimbursement
claims.69 The undisputed evidence showed, however, that a judgment
against the husband's separate interest had been paid with community
funds. 70 Therefore, the Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals found that
the trial court's refusal to reimburse the community for half of the com-
munity funds used to pay the judgment debt was unsupported by the evi-
dence and an abuse of discretion.71 In Knight, the court of appeals also
found that the trial court should have reimbursed the community on the
basis of constructive fraud. 72 During the first year of their informal mar-
riage, the wife had discovered that her husband had been making gratui-
tous payments to his ex-wife in the amount of $500 a month for
approximately one year.73 Although he had testified that his wife was
aware of the payments to his ex-wife long before their marriage, he later
admitted that he had lied to her in saying that he had stopped making
payments during this time.74 Because his wife did not consent to the pay-
ments, and since he had admitted to deceiving her about making them,
the court of appeals found that the trial court should have granted reim-
bursement to the community estate for the payments made over a period
of one year. The court of appeals awarded the wife community assets of
half of the value of the reimbursement amount to rectify the constructive
fraud. 75
2. Economic Contribution
In a decree of divorce or annulment, a court shall determine the rights
of both spouses claimed as economic contribution that a court considers
just and right. 76 Such economic contribution is measured by the reduc-
tion of the principal amount of debt secured by a lien on property owned
before marriage to the extent that the debt existed at the time of mar-
riage. 77 Prior to September 1, 2009, section 3.403 of the Texas Family
Code provided that "[a] marital estate that makes an economic contribu-
tion to the property owned by another marital estate has a claim for eco-
nomic contribution with respect to the benefitted estate."78 Furthermore,
section 3.403 provided a formula for calculating the economic
contribution.
"[A] claim for equitable contribution is a statutory remedy designed to
compensate a contributing estate for the reduction in principal amount of
69. Id.
70. Id. at 727.
71. Id. at 733.




76. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.007(2) (West 2006); Id. § 7.001.
77. Id. § 3.402(3).
78. In re Cigainero, 305 S.W.3d 798, 800 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2010, no pet.) (quot-
ing repealed TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.403 (Vernon 2006)).
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debt secured by a lien on property owned by the benefitting estate." 79
On the other hand, "the recovery for reimbursement-expenditures of a
contributing estate used to improve property of the benefitting estate-is
based only in equity" and "lies within the trial court's discretion. ' 80 In In
re Ciainero, the Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
award of economic contribution to the community estate under former
section 3.403 of the Family Code.81 In that case, community rental in-
come generated by the husband's separate property duplexes was used to
pay down the mortgages of the husband's separate property duplexes.
82
The economic contribution to the husband's benefitted estate (the du-
plexes) could be measured by a reduction in its debt.83 Thus, the trial
court did not err in awarding the community an amount to be split be-
tween the divorcing parties.84
Furthermore, the court of appeals found that the trial court did not err
by refusing to allow for an offset against the economic contribution claim
for the community rental income (of the duplexes) that benefitted the
community estate.85 The husband argued that he was entitled to an offset
because the parties' income tax records showed that the community es-
tate had benefitted from tax deductions taken each year as a result of the
duplexes' depreciation.86 However, the postnuptial income from the hus-
band's separate property was community property, and although the
community estate benefitted from the rental income, it was not due to
contributions made by the husband's separate estate.87 The court of ap-
peals did, however, affirm the trial court's consideration of the benefits
received by the community for tax deductions from depreciation of the
husband's separate property in offsetting them against the wife's claims
for reimbursement. 88 The court of appeals, nevertheless, refused to apply
this offset to economic contribution, as doing so would have allowed the
husband a double recovery.89 The court of appeals concluded that there
was no authority in the Family Code suggesting that offsets, which are
equitably determined, could be applied to claims for economic
contribution.90
79. Cigainero, 305 S.W.3d at 802.
80. Id. (internal citations omitted).
81. Id. at 803.
82. See id. at 801-02.
83. Id. at 799.
84. Id. at 801-02.
85. Id. at 803.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 802.
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III. MANAGEMENT AND LIABILITY OF
MARITAL PROPERTY
A. LIABILITY OF MARITAL PROPERTY IN BANKRUPTCY
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005 (BAPCPA) expands a court's ability to dismiss a Chapter 7 bank-
ruptcy case by establishing a presumption of abuse against the debtor
when a debtor seeking relief under Chapter 7 is above a median income.
Whereas before the adoption of BAPCPA, "an individual debtor with pri-
marily consumer debts [enjoyed] a presumption in favor of receiving dis-
charge relief, BAPCPA reversed that process," and under § 707(b) the
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Texas in In re Dumas91 in-
serted a means test for a debtor with an above-median income.92 The
presumption of abuse is strictly enforced, and "[w]hen the presumption of
abuse applies, a debtor's ability to rebut that presumption is extremely
limited. ' 93 Even when such a presumption does not apply, a trial court
may find dismissal warranted either because the petition was filed in bad
faith or because, under the "totality of the circumstances," awarding a
debtor relief under Chapter 7 would constitute an abuse. 94 The totality
test in § 707(b)(3)(B) is an amalgamation of various tests developed by
courts to determine the existence of substantial abuse in the pre-
BAPCPA era.95 Basically, the courts have "sought to identify those fac-
tors which, when combined with a demonstration of a debtor's ability to
pay debts from future earnings, would reveal an abuse of the privilege to
obtain a Chapter 7 discharge. '96 However, as noted in In re Dumas, "in
its adoption of the totality test, BAPCPA did not specify nor did it en-
dorse any particular means by which to identify the existence of abuse. '97
Thus, courts have continued to use the various totality factors identified
in the pre-BAPCPA jurisprudence in order to evaluate current dismissal
motions based upon § 707(b)(3)(B). '' 98 The list of factors considered
generally includes the circumstances surrounding a debtor's finances in
the past and future, whether the debtor had legitimate need for filing.99
In Dumas, there was no issue of bad faith, and all parties recognized
that the couple filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy had a legitimate need due
to the husband's continuing employment problems. 1°° There the bank-
ruptcy court focused on the debtor's future finances and considered
whether the amount of a monthly house payment "singularly support[ed]
91. See In re Dumas, 419 B.R. 704, 707 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2009); see 11 U.S.C. §
707(b)(3)(B).
92. Dumas, 419 B.R. at 707.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 708.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.; see In re King, No. 08-41975, 2009 WL 62252, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2009).
99. See id.
100. Dumas, 419 B.R. at 709.
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a finding of abuse under the totality of circumstances test of
§ 707(b)(3)."'' 1 The debtor's monthly mortgage payment at the time of
filing for bankruptcy was consuming almost thirty-six percent of the
couple's gross income, "thereby creating a sustainable foundation for the
accusation that the [d]ebtors are maintaining [a very] expensive home at
the expense of their unsecured creditors."' 0 2
It would appear under all the circumstances that the bankruptcy court
would reach a fair and just result in finding the debtor's monthly housing
expenses to be unreasonably large. However, the bankruptcy court rec-
ognized that "just results in bankruptcy cases must find their root in the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.' 10 3 Despite the United States Trus-
tee's allegations that the debtor's mortgage payments were unreasonable
and better suited to a Chapter 13 filing, in reading the plain language of
the statute, the bankruptcy court noted that § 1325(b)(3) provides that
"[almounts reasonably necessary to be expended ... shall be determined
in accordance with subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 707(b)(2).' 110 4
Whether or not it was aligned with Congress's intent, the bankruptcy
court failed to find in § 707(b)(2) "any limit on the amount of debt which
can be legitimately secured by a principal residence for Chapter 7 pur-
poses."'1 05 Thus, the trustee was precluded from attacking the reasona-
bleness of the debtor's mortgage payment.'0 6 Without any other
evidence that would indicate an abuse under the "totality" of the circum-
stances, the bankruptcy court held in Dumas that "the housing payment
has been effectively immunized from scrutiny on the basis of reasonable-
ness in a Chapter 13 or Chapter 11 case" because both chapters rely on




In their joint Chapter 13 petition, the husband and wife in In re Villar-
real, claimed that the restaurant they owned and operated was their
homestead residence.' 08 The Chapter 13 trustee objected to the exemp-
tion on the ground that the debtor couple did not use the property as
their residence.' 0 9 The trustee for the holders of a lien on the property
also objected to the homestead claim and asserted that the debtors did
not own the property as a consequence of a pre-petition foreclosure. 1"0
101. Id.




106. Id. at 711.
107. Id.
108. In re Villareal, 401 B.R. 823, 827-28 (Bankr. S.D. Tex-2009).
109. Id. at 828.
110. Id. at 827.
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In 2007, several years before the couple's bankruptcy filing, the hus-
band settled several lawsuits by giving a promissory note payable to the
trustee and secured by a deed of trust, which constituted a lien on the
couple's property."1 Neither the note nor the deed of trust made any
mention of the property's homestead character apart from a disclaimer in
the trust that specifically stated that the property was not used for resi-
dential purposes. 1" 2 After defaulting on their note, the trustee foreclosed
his lien on the couple's home."13 The couple responded with a suit for
wrongful foreclosure, but before the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of Texas could rule on the matter, the couple filed for bankruptcy
and claimed the property as their homestead. 114
In support of their homestead claim, the couple and their daughter tes-
tified that, since 2005, the family had occupied the restaurant portion of
the building behind a black curtain in an attempt to maintain a profes-
sional atmosphere. 1 5 A friend of the wife also testified that even though
it was never stated to her, she understood that the restaurant was the
couple's home. 16 Despite their concealed living arrangements, the bank-
ruptcy court concluded that the debtors' use of the property was suffi-
cient to constitute a homestead because "[a]ctual use is the most
satisfactory and convincing evidence of intention. 11 7 The bankruptcy
court rejected the argument that overt acts of homestead use must be
"open to view" or "open to public view," as determined by the Fifth cir-
cuit in In re Bradley." 8
Turning to the question of the validity of the lien created to secure
payment of the note given as part of the settlement agreement, the bank-
ruptcy court noted that the lien did not fit within any of the eight in-
stances provided under the Constitution and was therefore invalid." 9
The bankruptcy court, nonetheless, found that the debtors were equitably
estopped from invalidating the lien.' 20 Even though courts have not es-
topped a claimant from asserting a homestead exemption based simply
on declarations made in a mortgage contract, in this instance the debtors'
use of the property was secret, "ambiguous," and insufficient to notify a
reasonably prudent person, such as in this instance the lien trustee, that
the property was a homestead. 12' The bankruptcy court also found that
because the lien was an essential part of the settlement agreement that
was announced in open court and on the record, the husband was judi-




115. Id. at 830.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 832 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
118. In re Bradley, 960 F.2d 502, 507 (5th Cir. 1992).
119. Villareal, 401 B.R. at 833.
120. Id. at 836.
121. Id. at 834-36.
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cially estopped from invalidating the lien.122 The wife, however, was not
a party to the proceeding, and the bankruptcy court found it unclear
whether she was represented by the same counsel as her husband. 123 The
bankruptcy court found that the burden was on the trustee to demon-
strate that judicial estoppel applied to her.' 24 The bankruptcy court nev-
ertheless concluded that both spouses were equitably estopped from
claiming a homestead exemption, but if the couple should prevail in their
adversary proceeding, the pre-petition foreclosure would be invalid,
though the lien would remain on the property as a secured claim in the
bankruptcy case. 125 The bankruptcy court further noted that if the pre-
petition foreclosure should be finally set aside in the adversary proceed-
ing, the debtors might still claim their homestead exemption except for
the secured claim.126 If, on the other hand, the pre-petition foreclosure
should be upheld, the property would not be part of the bankruptcy
estate.
127
In In re Norra,128 the debtor's assertion of a homestead exemption was
contested by Harris County and two state agencies: the Texas Commis-
sion on Environmental Quality ("TCEQ") and the Department of State
Health Services (collectively, "the State"). 12 9 The debtor claimed two
mobile home parks, Reidland and Lauder, as her rural homestead despite
the fact that they were located about twenty miles apart.130 As her
source of income, she rented mobile homes and spaces on both properties
to tenants by a month-to-month oral lease arrangement. 3 1 Norra resided
on the Reidland property, on which she owned many of the mobile
homes,132 but she had never lived on the Lauder property. 33 However,
she asserted that she had used numerous mobile homes on the Lauder
property for various purposes, such as storage space for her personal be-
longings and sometimes as a place to stay overnight. 3 4 Though she did
not live on the property, Norra claimed it as her homestead. 135 In addi-
tion, she claimed that four of the mobile homes on the Lauder property
were a portion of her homestead.' 36 The State did not object to her claim
of a homestead exemption for the four trailers on the Reidland property
that Norra did use as her home but did object to the claim that other
homes at Reidland and all the property and homes on the Lauder prop-
122. Id. at 837-38.
123. Id. at 838.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 839.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. In re Norra, 421 B.R. 782, 782 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009).
129. Id. at 785.
130. Id. at 785-86.
131. Id. at 786.




136. Id. at 788.
[Vol. 64
Family Law: Husband and Wife
erty were her homestead.137 Except for the trailer on Reidland where
Norra lived, Harris County objected to her claim that both properties
constituted her homestead. 138 Both the State and Harris County argued
that "the permanent renting of the remaining mobile homes at Reidland
and lack of [a] residence at Lauder 'depriv[ed] the respective properties
of homestead status." 139
With respect to the Lauder property, the Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of Texas compared this dispute to the landmark case of
Autry v. Reasor.140 In Autry, the debtor had rented thirty-nine acres of
non-contiguous, rural land in exchange for a portion of his tenant's crop.
The Texas Supreme Court held that "renting non-contiguous land
"depriv[ed] [the land] of its homestead character.'",,41 Building on Autry,
later courts have held that "the act of renting non-contiguous land, alone,
is insufficient to impress homestead status upon th[at] land, even though
the rental income is used by the debtor for financial support.' 42 Even
though the Fifth Circuit has recently held that in some cases, non-contigu-
ous property may enjoy homestead status (such as a garage, lot, or play-
ground),143 "the Fifth Circuit made [it] clear that non-contiguous rent[ed]
property does not enjoy the same treatment,"'144 and that "[s]eparate land
.. devoted primarily to generating income for the family.., is not used
principally for home purposes and thus it is not included in the rural
homestead."145
Norra used the trailers on the Lauder property as a place to keep spare
parts primarily for business use, and her only other use of the premises
was as a place of relaxation during working hours, as opposed to traveling
to the property with the specific intent of relaxing there.146 Therefore,
the bankruptcy court held that the Lauder property, as a whole, was pri-
marily used as an additional means of generating rental income-a use
insufficient to impress upon the property an independent homestead
character as non-contiguous property.147
Because Harris County wished to sever the Reidland property into
homestead and non-homestead sections, 148 the bankruptcy court consid-
ered whether Norra had abandoned the property. The court reasoned
that, as "[aibsent abandonment, the [forced] severance of a tract of land




140. See Autry v. Reasor, 108 S.W. 1162, 1162 (Tex. 1908); In re Norra, 421 B.R. at 791.
141. In re Norra, 421 B.R. at 791 (alteration in original) (citing Autry, 108 S.W. at 1162).
142. Id.; see also In re Baker, 307 B.R. 860, 863 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003) ("The payment
of rent is not the type of 'support' that Texas homestead law recognizes as providing 'com-
fort, convenience, or support of the family."').
143. In re Perry, 345 F.3d 303, 318 n.22 (5th Cir. 2003).
144. Norra, 421 B.R. at 791.
145. Perry, 345 F.3d at 318 n.22 (emphasis added).
146. Norra, 421 B.R. at 792.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 793.
20111
SMU LAW REVIEW
severed tract is used for homestead purposes. 149
In In re Perry, a debtor owned and operated an RV park on a tract of
twenty-six rural acres adjoining a small, rural tract that the debtor and his
wife made their home. 150 The circuit court was faced with resolving the
issue of whether a rural resident could satisfy the homestead exemption
requirement by conducting a "'business or calling"' on the same tract as
his residence, which was used for non-agricultural purposes.15' The issue
ultimately turned on whether the property was "temporarily or perma-
nently rented" by the tenant. 152 The court stated:
In order to determine whether property has been rented on a tem-
porary or permanent basis,... the court should determine whether,
and if so, over what portions of property, the debtor released posses-
sion and control. Then, the court should consider [the debtor's] in-
tent with respect to that portion of the property. If [the debtor]
intended to resume control over the property, the property will not
lose its homestead character. 153
The court based its determination of temporarily and permanently
rented property on factors applied in Hollifield v. Hilton.154 There the
court of appeals found that factors such as the renting of property adjoin-
ing the residence to tenants on a month-to-month basis and the ability to
restore the land to its agricultural state with "a minimum of effort," of
primary significance in determining the property's homestead status.' 55
As in Hollifield, the tenants at Reidland rented on a month-to-month
basis, and thus Norra only temporarily "released possession and control"
over a portion of her residence.156 Because vacancy levels fluctuated,
Norra was able to resume control and frequently did SO. 1 5 7 Norra testi-
fied that she did not intend to abandon that portion of the residence by
renting it.' 58 Because after reviewing the evidence the bankruptcy court
found that she could restore the land to its agricultural state "'with mini-
mal of effort,"' she established the requisite "intent to resume
control." 159
Even though the Reidland property had been used as a rental property
for over twenty years and would likely continue to be so used in the fu-
ture, the bankruptcy court did not limit its holding regarding what consti-
149. Id.
150. Perry, 345 F.3d at 307.
151. Id. at 318; see also Norra, 421 B.R. at 794.
152. Norra, 421 B.R. at 794.
153. Id. at 795.
154. Id. See also Hollifield v. Hilton, 515 S.W.2d 717, 719-21 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that where appellants owned and resided on a con-
tiguous sixty-acre rural farm and used eighteen acres as a mobile home park, the eighteen-
acre tract was part of the rural homestead).
155. Norra, 421 B.R. at 796.
156. Id. at 797.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 797-98.
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tutes temporary rentals of homestead property. 160 As noted by the court,
"Hollifield and Perry both focused upon the temporary nature of the
leases[,]... not the overall duration in which the [mobile home] park was
in operation.'' a Texas homestead laws are to be construed liberally. 162
Thus, the bankruptcy court felt it was of primary significance that a claim-
ant in Texas be protected by the homestead laws so as not to have "to
expend inordinate resources litigating over whether a particular rental
([such as], a home rented on a month-to-month basis while a serviceman
was overseas for an extended tour of duty) constituted [a] temporary or
permanent rental.' 1 63
In Mitchell v. Stringfellow, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Eastern District of Texas found that an evidentiary hearing was needed in
order to determine whether the use of a mobile home on a sand pit pri-
marily used for commercial purposes constituted the defendant's home-
stead. 164 The Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee sought enforcement of a
non-appealable judgment against the defendant in order to make distri-
butions to creditors in a related bankruptcy suit by foreclosing a judg-
ment lien against the sand pit property owned by the defendant. 165 When
the bankruptcy proceeding was commenced, and until the judgment was
entered, the defendant was residing in Oklahoma. 66 Shortly after the
bankruptcy proceeding was commenced, the defendant and his wife
moved their motor home onto the Texas sand pit property. 67 Each party
filed a motion for summary judgment seeking a determination as to
whether the sand pit qualified as a homestead. 168 The bankruptcy court
denied both motions and found that from the facts, it could not make a
determination at the summary judgment phase of the case. 169 Although
the defendant claimed in his affidavit that he and his wife had moved
from Oklahoma in order to make their home in Texas the bankruptcy
court found that more evidence was needed in order to make a determi-
nation of whether he had truly abandoned the Oklahoma property.'70
The trustee submitted evidence that the defendant's employer used the
sand pit primarily for commercial purposes and that the majority of the
property located on the land belonged to his employer. 171 However, the
bankruptcy court found that the conflicting testimony regarding the
land's use created a sufficient fact issue to make summary judgment inap-
propriate. 72 In light of the significant constitutional character of a resi-
160. Id. at 798.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 799.
164. Mitchell v. Stringfellow, 434 B.R. 412, 417-19 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2010).
165. Id. at 415.
166. Id. at 417.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 415.
169. Id. at 418.
170. Id. at 418-19.
171. Id. at 418.
172. Id. at 419.
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dent's right to claim a homestead, an assessment of the defendant's
intentions could not be made on the record in the absence of an eviden-
tiary hearing to assess the credibility of the witnesses and the evidence
regarding the two parcels of land.173
2. Liens on Homesteads
The Texas Constitution requires that a lien on a homestead be given
voluntarily, 174 and the 2003 amendments to the Texas Constitution "allow
the Texas Finance Commission to promulgate interpretative regulations
of the home equity loan provisions.' 75 The Texas Finance Commission
has interpreted section 50(a)(6)(Q)(i) of those provisions "to mean that
'[an owner may apply for a home equity loan for any purpose."' 176
Thus, "'[a]n owner is not precluded from voluntarily using the proceeds
of an equity loan to pay on a debt owed to the lender."1 77 Whether the
debtor acts voluntarily is to be determined on the facts of each case. 178 In
In re Chambers, the bankruptcy court found that the couple's financial
difficulties necessitated the refinancing of a loan and that the lender's
exercising its right to foreclose on the property rendered the debtor's ac-
tions involuntary. 179 Further, the economic duress required to show an
involuntary agreement must be based on some act of the lender and "not
merely on the financial circumstances of the purported victim."180 The
bankruptcy court found that the couple in Chambers enjoyed above-aver-
age accommodations by the lender and did not enter into the loan agree-
ment until more than three weeks after being made aware of the lender's
intention to foreclose. 181 The fact that the couple was facing the loss of
their home by foreclosure did not preclude them "from voluntarily enter-
ing into a refinancing agreement."'1 82
A debtor who utilizes fraudulently-obtained funds as a means of reduc-
ing debt on the debtor's homestead cannot invalidate an agreed judgment
to provide the injured party with an equitable lien on the property by
claiming an exemption in bankruptcy under § 552(f) of the Bankruptcy
Code or any other device. 183 In In re Gamble-Ledbetter, the debtor had
performed bookkeeping services for the creditor for several years. 184 Af-
ter an extensive investigation indicated that the debtor-bookkeeper had
embezzled a large amount of funds, the creditor sued the debtor in state
173. See id.
174. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(A).
175. In re Chambers, 419 B.R. 652,671 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2009) (citing TEX. FIN. CODE
§ 11.308 (West 2010)).
176. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 153.18(2) (2006)) (Joint
Fin. Regulatory Agencies, Home Equity Lending).
177. Id. (alteration in original).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 671-72.
180. Id. at 672.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. In re Gamble-Ledbetter, 419 B.R. 682, 699-702 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2009).
184. Id. at 688.
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court. 185 On the eve of trial, however, the creditor reached a settlement
with the debtor whereby the creditor was awarded an equitable interest
in the debtor's homestead. 186 On the same day that the settlement was
reached, the debtor filed for a Chapter 7 discharge.187 The equitable lien
was granted to the creditor through an agreed judgment, after the credi-
tor showed substantial evidence indicating that the debtor had made
mortgage payments using the embezzled funds. The United States Bank-
ruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Texas found that the creditor held
superior equitable title to the property and that title did not constitute an
improper impairment of any exemption right of the debtor under
§ 522(f).188 Thus, a debtor may not rely on a homestead exemption to
invalidate an equitable interest in property in a bankruptcy proceeding
when stolen funds of the equitable interest-holder are used for the
purchase of the homestead. 189
In Fairfield Financial Group, Inc. v. Synnott,190 the Austin Court of
Appeals joined other courts' interpretations of a statutory homestead ex-
emption and held, contrary to the Third District's previous holding, that
"other than the types listed in property code section 41.001(b), judgment
liens that have been properly abstracted nevertheless cannot attach to a
homestead while that property remains a homestead:"
A judgment debtor may sell property claimed as homestead and
pass title free of any judgment lien, and the purchaser may assert
that title against the judgment creditor. A judgment lien may attach
to the judgment debtor's interest, however, if he abandons the prop-
erty as his homestead while he owns it and while there is a properly
abstracted judgment lien against him.19'
In Fairfield, the judgment creditor had successfully obtained and ab-
stracted a judgment against the husband's homestead interest.192 Al-
though the husband later conveyed his interest to his wife pursuant to
their final divorce decree, the judgment creditor argued that its interest
had properly attached to the husband's ownership interest before the di-
vorce and thus could not pass to the wife.193 The court of appeals con-
cluded, however, "that the timing and effect of [the husband's] actions
[were] irrelevant because the property remained at all relevant times pro-
tected by [the wife's] undivided homestead interest in the property. ' 194
Whether the husband "abandoned his homestead interest before divest-
ing his ownership interest" did not matter because it was undisputed that
the wife "had a homestead interest" that "protected the entire property
185. Id. at 689.
186. Id. at 690.
187. Id. at 691.
188. Id. at 701.
189. Id. 701-02.
190. 300 S.W.3d 316, 316 (Tex. App.-Austin 2009, not pet.).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 318.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 321.
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and the judgment liens did not attach to any portion of the property." 195
The Austin Court of Appeals went on to say that although attorney's
fees may not be awarded in suits to quiet title, the ban tends to "be lim-
ited to cases that [are] essentially trespass to try title suits."'1 96 Even
though the judgment in Fairfield had an effect similar to that of a suit to
quiet title, the central issue was "whether the homestead had been aban-
doned such that an encumbrance other than one of those listed in prop-
erty code § 41.001(b)" could be properly fixed onto the property.197
Since attorney's fees are recoverable in a declaratory judgment action,
the trial court in Fairfield did not err in awarding fees to the wife. 198
IV. DIVISION ON DIVORCE
A. DIVISION PROCEEDINGS
In order for a Texas appellate court to review an appellant's brief, the
brief must contain "a clear and concise argument for the contentions [as-
serted], with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record."1 99 In
the absence of cited supporting legal authority, a Texas appellate court is
under no duty to review the appellant's brief.2° ° In Hernandez v. Her-
nandez, the appealing husband argued that the trial court erred when it
held him in contempt and awarded monies and arrearages to his wife.20 '
On appeal, however, the El Paso Court of Appeals refused to address the
appellant's complaints based on the finding that his arguments were un-
supported by citations to any relevant legal authority, and therefore
failed to support his contentions by applying the law to the facts estab-
lished in the record.20 2 Thus, the court of appeals concluded that the hus-
band had waived these issues. 20 3
"[A] default judgment of divorce is subject to an evidentiary attack on
appeal. '20 4 Thus, if a respondent does not appear or answer, the peti-
tioner is still obligated to support material allegations listed in the peti-
tion with evidence at trial.20 5 In Vazquez v. Vazquez, the husband
appealed a default divorce decree arguing that the evidence offered at
trial was insufficient to support the relief granted to the wife by the trial
court. 20 6 The Houston Court of Appeals agreed; it reversed and re-
195. Id. at 323.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. See also TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.009 (West 2008).
199. Hernandez v. Hernandez, 318 S.W.3d 464, 466 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2010, no pet.)
(quoting TEX. R. App. P. 38.1(i)).





204. Vazquez v. Vazquez, 292 S.W.3d 80, 84 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no
pet.).
205. See id.
206. Id. at 82.
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manded in part and affirmed in part.20 7
Specifically, the court of appeals found that the appellee-wife had
failed to produce evidence to support a divorce on the ground of cru-
elty. 20 8 The wife merely referred to an affidavit attached to a petition for
a protective order issued prior to the trial.209 The affidavit alleged that
her husband had pulled her out of her car by her hair and forced her to
the ground in the presence of their children. 210 The court of appeals
pointed out that the wife had cited no authority stating that a party may
rely on an affidavit attached to a pretrial motion to satisfy its burden to
present evidence at a hearing. 211 Similarly, the wife failed to offer evi-
dence sufficient to support the property division as "just and right." 212
The record was devoid of any specifics regarding the nature or value of
the property or debts.213 Due to the material influence that the property
division may have on child-support payments, the issues of child support
and insurance were remanded,214 The husband also contested his obliga-
tion to pay attorney's fees, which the court of appeals reversed as the wife
failed to offer any evidence regarding the reasonableness of her attor-
ney's fees. 215 Finally, the court of appeals sustained the husband's chal-
lenge to the purported agreement between the parties.216 The contested
provisions dealt with alternative dispute resolution, party acknowledg-
ments "about signing the divorce decree," and indemnification "regard-
ing debts incurred by one party for which the other party [might] be
liable. '217 Because the husband had never agreed to the contested provi-
sions, the court of appeals sustained his petition.218
In In re Provine,219 the couple had agreed to incorporate a mediated
settlement agreement into their divorce decree. Their agreement stated
that any disputes arising due to performance of the agreement would be
settled by binding arbitration.220 After their divorce, the former wife pe-
titioned for enforcement of the agreement, contending that her former
husband had not properly performed his obligations pursuant to the
property division set forth in the agreement.221 The ex-husband moved
to compel arbitration according to the arbitration clause in the agree-
ment.222 The trial court found that the mediation and arbitration provi-
207. Id.




212. Id. at 85.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 86.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 87.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 86.
219. 312 S.W.3d 824, 826 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.).
220. Id. at 827.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 827-28.
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sions were merged into the decree of divorce and that post-divorce
matters would be determined by the trial court.223 The Houston First
Court of Appeals reversed.
The court of appeals found that, under its continuing jurisdiction, it
could only enforce or clarify the decree. 224 The original divorce court's
plenary power was not in dispute, and therefore the court of appeals
could not amend, modify, or alter the decree. 225 Thus, as the agreement
to arbitrate any dispute arising from the performance of the divorce de-
cree was incorporated into the parties' agreement, the court of appeals
determined that such an agreement to arbitrate the dispute should be
enforced. 226 Finding that the agreement contemplated post-divorce dis-
putes because it related to "performance" of the agreement, the court
determined that the former wife's claims in her motion to enforce fell
within the scope of the agreement.227 The court of appeals concluded
that the trial court erred in refusing to compel arbitration of the
dispute.228
In Chavez v. McNeely,229 the Houston First District Court of Appeals
affirmed that the trial court granting a divorce does not have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear a suit brought to enforce a property settlement agree-
ment entered into upon divorce. '230 As noted by the court of appeals,
"[a] suit to recover missed payments does not involve matters incident to
divorce, but is instead more akin to an independent action on a con-
tract. ' 231 Section 9.001 of the Family Code provides that "[a] party af-
fected by a decree of divorce ... may request enforcement of that decree
by filing suit to enforce as provided by this chapter in the court that ren-
dered the decree. '232 The language of section 9.001 "is permissive in na-
ture rather than mandatory," and "had the legislature intended § 9.001
... to provide exclusive jurisdiction, it could have done so by using clear
statutory language. '233 Thus, the court of appeals in Chavez found that
"the breach of ... an agreement incorporated into a final divorce decree
... [in which money damages were sought] invoke[d] the general jurisdic-
tion of the district court. '234
The court of appeals in Chavez, concluded that the support agreement
incorporated into the divorce decree, which required the former wife to
pay "as much as possible," with amounts limited only by her "personal
223. Id. at 828.
224. Id. at 829-30.
225. Id. at 830.
226. Id. at 831.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. 287 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.).
230. Id. at 845.
231. Id. (citing Underhill v. Underhill, 614 S.W.2d 178, 180 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
232. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.001 (West 2006) (emphasis added).
233. Chavez, 287 S.W.3d at 844.
234. Id. at 845.
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financial situation," toward the former husband's "needs," was too indefi-
nite to be enforced. 235
In a brief opinion in Chrisman v. Chrisman,236 the El Paso Court of
Appeals held that an individual in a dissolution of marriage proceeding
does not enjoy a "constitutional right to effective assistance of coun-
sel."' 237 After a year of marriage, the husband had filed for divorce and
his wife counter-petitioned. 238 The final decree, grounded on insup-
portability, awarded the "marital home, its contents," and two vehicles to
the husband. 239 "The wife was awarded spousal maintenance in the [to-
tal] amount of $5,000 ... [over a period of ten months] ... and $750 in
attorney's fees. 240 The wife appealed the judgment on the ground that
she was denied the effective assistance of counsel.241 "She cite[d] no au-
thority for her" position, nor did the court of appeals find any such sup-
port.2 42 The court of appeals noted that "while the constitutional right of
effective counsel has been extended to certain civil proceedings," this
case was not one of them.243 This case was neither a termination of pa-
rental rights nor was the wife a subject of an involuntary civil commit-
ment proceeding. 244 Thus, the wife was not a litigant afforded the right to
effective assistance of counsel.245 Because no Texas court has recognized
a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in a dissolution
proceeding, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's holding.2 46
To prevail on a restricted appeal, an appellant must demonstrate that:
(1) the notice of restricted appeal was filed within six months of the date
of the judgment or order; (2) he was a party to the suit; (3) he did not
participate in the hearing and did not timely file a post-judgment motion
or request findings of fact and conclusions of law; and (4) error is appar-
ent on the face of the record. 247 In determining the non-participation
requirement of a restricted appeal, the Texas Supreme Court asked
"whether the appellant took part in the decision making event that re-
sult[ed] in the adjudication of [his] rights. '248 Because "[t]he decision
235. Id.
236. Chrisman v. Chrisman, 296 S.W.3d 706, 706 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2009, no pet.).
237. Id. at 706-07.





243. Id.; see In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 544 (Tex. 2003) (finding that parents are enti-
tled to effective assistance of counsel in termination proceedings); see also In re Protection
of H.W., 85 S.W.3d 348, 355-56 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2002, no pet.) (finding that individuals
in involuntary civil commitment proceedings have the right to effective assistance of
counsel).
244. Chrisman, 296 S.W.3d at 707.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. See TEx. R. App. P. 30; see also Alexander v. Lynda's Boutique, 134 S.W.3d 845,
848 (Tex. 2004).
248. Texaco, Inc. v. Cen. Power & Light Co., 925 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex. 1996); Parsons
v. Dallas Cnty., 182 S.W.3d 451, 453 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).
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making event is the proceeding in which the questions of law and fact are
decided... [i]n a divorce case, it follows that the decision-making event is
the event in which the final divorce decree is proven up."2
49
In Cox v. Cox, the Austin Court of Appeals found that when there are
substantive differences between a settlement agreement and the final di-
vorce decree, "those differences make the hearing where the final decree
was proven up and entered the decision-making event. '250 Prior to the
hearing in Cox, the parties had signed a negotiated settlement agreement
for temporary orders.251 However, at the default judgment hearing (from
which the husband was absent) the divorce decree contained substantive
differences from the written settlement agreement. 252 These differences
included provisions for the division of marital property, custody of the
children, and attorney's fees-none of which were included in the written
settlement agreement.253 Thus, the court of appeals found that the hus-
band "did not participate in the decision-making event by participating in
the settlement negotiations and signing the settlement agreement where
the final divorce decree [was] substantively different from the written set-
tlement agreement. '254
Further, the court of appeals examined whether there was error on the
face of the record in accordance with the fourth requirement of a re-
stricted appeal. 255 The husband contended that he was not properly
served with the first amended petition. 256 Addressing this issue, the court
of appeals found that because the wife did not serve the husband with the
amended petition until the morning of the default hearing, and because
the address at which she served him was the address of the marital prop-
erty that was awarded to her by the temporary order, the husband "was
not [properly] served in strict compliance with the rules of civil proce-
dure. '257 Moreover, because the amended petition requested more oner-
ous relief than the written settlement agreement, the court of appeals
found that the husband could not have been given "constructive notice
such that [she] did not have to serve him [with the amended petition] in
accordance with Rule 21(a)."'2 58
In general, when a party to a suit dies the suit will not abate if the cause
of action survives the death of that party.259 "[I]t is well settled that a
cause of action for a divorce is purely personal and the cause of action for
249. Cox v. Cox, 298 S.W.3d 726, 731 (Tex. App.-Austin 2009, no pet.); see Barnett v.
Barnett, 750 S.W.2d 881, 883 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
250. Id. at 730, 732.
251. Id. at 729.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 732.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 732-33; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 21 (requiring service at least three days before
the hearing unless the time is shortened by the court); TEx. R. Cxv. P. 63 (requiring leave
of the court before filing an amended pleading within seven days of date of trial).
258. Id. at 734.
259. TEX. R. Civ. P. 150.
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a divorce terminates on the death of either spouse prior to the rendition
of a judgment granting a divorce. ' '26° Furthermore, "[t]he death of either
party to the divorce action prior to entry of the divorce decree withdraws
the court's subject matter jurisdiction over the divorce action."'261 Al-
though seemingly simple, such a rule can have very significant conse-
quences as illustrated by Pollard v. Pollard.
In Pollard, the wife had filed for divorce from her husband in 1992
(Pollard J).262 The trial court signed a final decree of divorce in 1996
(First Decree), and the husband appealed the judgment.263 As the trial
court had entered a judgment based on a repudiated settlement agree-
ment, the cause was remanded. 264 Neither ex-spouse filed a motion for
rehearing regarding the opinion.265 Following the remand of Pollard I,
the ex-wife filed and received a final divorce decree signed by the trial
court in May 2001 (Second Decree). 266 The husband appealed and the
appellate court "concluded that the trial court abused its discretion when
it denied [his] motion to disqualify [his ex-wife's] attorney" and again, the
judgment was reversed and remanded to the trial court. 267 However,
before litigation proceeded on remand, and unknown to the trial court or
the husband, the wife died in October 2004.268 A probate action was then
instituted in Dallas County, and the Pollards' son was appointed indepen-
dent executor of the estate of his mother in February 2005.269 Shortly
thereafter, the husband learned of his wife's death and filed a number of
unsecured claims against her estate in the probate proceeding. 270 How-
ever, still unaware of the wife's death, the trial court in the divorce case
dismissed it for want of prosecution in February 2005.271 No appeal of
the dismissal was filed until August 2007, when the husband filed a mo-
tion to vacate the trial court's dismissal for want of prosecution and a
motion to dismiss the divorce case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The couple's son, who was his mother's executor, filed a notice of appear-
260. Pollard v. Pollard, 316 S.W.3d 246, 250 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.) (quoting
Garrison v. Tex. Commerce Bank, 560 S.W.2d 451, 453 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
261. Id. (citing Garcia v. Daggett, 742 S.W.2d 808, 810 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1987, orig. proceeding [leave denied]) (the death of wife immediately deprived the court of
jurisdiction over the divorce action, and temporary custody orders entered after the death
of wife were void); Parr v. White, 543 S.W.2d 445, 448 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christ
1976), writ ref d n.r.e by per curiam op., 559 S.W.2d 344, 344 (Tex. 1977) (death of either
party prior to entry of divorce decree withdraws court's subject matter jurisdiction of un-
derlying divorce litigation)).
262. Id. at 247.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 247-48.
266. Id. at 248.








ance in September 2007.272 A year later, the trial court signed an order
vacating as void the February 2005 order of dismissal for want of prosecu-
tion and, in light of the wife's death, dismissed the divorce action for want
of jurisdiction. 273 The executor-son's appeal followed.27 4
The central issue on appeal in determining the trial court's jurisdiction
was whether the couple were divorced at the time of the wife's death.275
According to her son, the executor, they were divorced as of the date of
the First Decree and the subsequent reversal of the First Decree applied
only to the division of the marital property.276 The husband took the
position "that because he [had] not file[d] a notice of limitation of appeal,
pursuant to the former Rule of Appellate Procedure 40(a)(4), ...the
entire case was [before the Dallas Court of Appeals] on appeal. '277 The
executor "admitt[ed] in his appellate brief in Pollard I" that ["the hus-
band had] limited his notice of appeal" by not contesting the dissolution
of the marriage.278 The court of appeals nevertheless found that "[t]he
only way Pollard could have limited the scope of his appeal in Pollard I
was by filing the notice under former Rule 40(a)(4). '279 Thus, the court
stated that the "appeal was not limited to the division of marital property,
and the statements in [the husband's] brief did not restrict the court of
appeal's jurisdiction over the trial court's judgment. '280 In cases in
which an appellate court has severed the issue of divorce and remanded
for re-division of the property alone, the court of appeals has done so
explicitly with clear instructions to the trial court regarding the sever-
ance. 281 In this case, the wife's death in 2004 meant that after the court of
appeals reversed and remanded Pollard II, the couple were still mar-
ried.282 Thus, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to decide the question of
divorce in 2005.283 Because the proper procedural disposition is to dis-
miss the divorce case when one of the parties to a divorce dies, the trial
court's February 2005 dismissal was proper.284
The Dallas Court of Appeals in Smith v. Deneve, addressed the issue of
awarding attorney's fees in an alleged informal marriage dispute.285 The
trial court awarded attorney's fees to the alleged wife when the alleged
husband filed for divorce, and the trial court issued summary judgment











282. Id. at 250.
283. Id. at 251.
284. Id.
285. 285 S.W.3d 904, 908, 916 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.).
286. Id. at 917.
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appealed, claiming that his alleged wife "specifically pled for recovery of
fees under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13 but [had] not prove[d] the
elements of that rule. '287 As a general rule, "[w]hen a party pleads a
specific ground for recovery of attorney's fees, that party is limited to that
ground and cannot recover attorney's fees on another, unpleaded
ground." 288
The court of appeals held that the alleged wife's pleadings were suffi-
ciently general to permit her to argue any available legal basis to support
an award of attorney's fees. 289 The court distinguished Kreighbaum v.
Lester, stating:
In Kreighbaum, the plaintiff sued the defendants for breach of
contract, fraud, and violation of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act
(DTPA). The defendants asserted a counterclaim that the plaintiff's
DTPA claims were groundless and that defendants were therefore
entitled to attorney's fees under § 17.50(c) of the Texas Business &
Commerce Code.". . . Because the defendants' subsequent motion
for attorneys' fees relied on a fee-shifting clause in the parties' con-
tract and not the DTPA, the jury did not award attorney's fees. 290
In contrast, "[the respondent] in Smith "did not cite any specific rule ...
as [the] sole ground for [her attorney's fees]."' 291 With her general plead-
ings, she was allowed to rely on any particular provision of law to support
an award for attorney's fees.292
The alleged husband also contended that his alleged wife could not rely
on the Family Code section 6.708(a) as a basis for her award of attorney's
fees.293 He argued that the statute required a finding of a marriage rela-
tionship before an award could be made.294 The alleged husband also
asserted that the award would only cover the divorce claim, not the entire
suit. The court of appeals denied both of his claims.295 The court of ap-
peals found that section 6.708(a) does not require that a marriage be
proved as a prerequisite for an award of attorney's fees. 296 That statute
also "authorizes the recovery of all attorneys' fees incurred in a 'suit' for
dissolution of a marriage, [not merely those for the] defense of a 'claim'
for dissolution. '297
287. Id. at 916.
288. Id. (quoting Kreighbaum v. Lester, No. 05-06-01333-CV, 2007 WL 1829729, at *2
(Tex. App.-Dallas June 27, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.)).
289. Id. at 917.
290. Id. at 916-17.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 917.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 917-18.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 918.
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B. MAKING THE DIVISION
In Mandell v. Mandell, the "primary issue [addressed by the Fort Worth
Court of Appeals was] whether the trial court erred by excluding [the
former wife's] evidence valuing [the former husband's] interest in (a pro-
fessional association)." 298 The couple, both physicians, were married in
1989.299 During their marriage, the husband entered into an employment
agreement and a stock purchase agreement with Oncology-Hermatology
Consultants, P.A. (the Association). 300 Under that agreement, the Asso-
ciation agreed to sell the husband 22,000 shares of common stock at fifty
cents per share for a total purchase price of $11,000.301 By their agree-
ment, the Association required the husband and wife to sign a sharehold-
ers' agreement. That agreement specifically addressed voluntary and
involuntary stock transfers in the event of divorce.302 It went on to pro-
vide that if any of the Association's shares were divided between the
couple by a divorce court, the divorced shareholder was required to
purchase "all but not less than all" of his stock from the former spouse at
fifty cents per share.303 Although the Association also required both
spouses to sign a shareholders' agreement, neither spouse actually signed
it. 304
"Approximately three years after [the husband] had executed the stock
purchase agreement, [the wife] filed for divorce. °30 5 The district court
divided the parties' property but refused to allow the wife to present ex-
pert testimony concerning the value of her husband's shares in the Asso-
ciation.306 The trial court found "that the Stock Purchase Agreement
between [the husband] and the Association was subject to the terms of
the Shareholders Agreement and that, as a matter of law, the Sharehold-
ers Agreement between [the husband] and the Association was valid and
enforceable [against the wife]. 3 07
On appeal, the wife argued that the trial court erred when it used the
shareholders' agreement to value the husband's 22,000 shares in the As-
sociation at $11,000.308 She asserted that the stock should have been val-
ued at its fair market value and that the trial court had erred when it did
not allow her to support the fair market value through expert testimony
and other evidence.30 9 The husband, however, offered evidence that
298. 310 S.W.3d 531, 533 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2010, pet. denied), remanded by no.




301. Id. at 533.
302. Id. at 533-34.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 534.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 535.
307. Id. at 534.
308. Id. at 535.
309. Id.
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"conclusively established that when three of the Association's seven phy-
sician-shareholders retired or had left the practice [in the past], they were
each paid [fifty cents] per share ... pursuant to the shareholders agree-
ment" and that the same treatment was his right.310
By statute, Texas professional associations have the same powers, privi-
leges, duties, restrictions, and liabilities as for-profit corporations. 311 Ac-
cordingly, the court of appeals found that "[t]he Association's property,
accounts receivable, retained earnings, and surplus funds [were] not as-
sets of [the couple's] community estate, ' 31 2 and "[therefore] were not
subject to division by the trial court. '313
As the partnership was a closely held corporation, "the assets and prof-
its of a professional association belong[ed] to the entity," 31 4 and the
shareholders' agreement specifically addressed stock ownership and
value in the event of divorce. The court of appeals therefore overruled
the wife's argument that she was entitled to prove the fair market value
of her husband's interest in the Association through expert testimony. 315
Finally, the court of appeals upheld the trial court's decision to grant
the husband's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict concern-
ing his attorney's fees. 316 The trial court merely found that his attorney's
fees were reasonably calculated at $200,000 rather than "zero," as deter-
mined by the jury.317 The trial court did not order the wife to pay for her
husband's attorney's fees, and nothing in the record indicated that if the
husband's motion for judgment non obstante veredicto had not been
granted, the wife would have been awarded attorney's fees to be paid by
the husband. 318 As noted by the court of appeals, the "trial court pos-
sesses broad discretion to award either spouse attorney's fees as a part of
the just and right division of the marital estate. '319
In Swaab v. Swaab, the husband "challenge[d] the trial court's final
judgment in his suit for divorce. ' 320 The trial court had ordered that the
husband assume full responsibility for repayment of any loans owed to
the husband's mother, who had provided financial assistance over the
course of the marriage. 32l The husband argued that the wife's proposed
property division, as well as his own, outlined an equal allocation of pay-
ments for the loans to his mother.322 Finding that the settlement agree-
ment made no particular mention of the loan to the husband's mother,
310. Id. at 538.
311. Id. at 539.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 539-40 (Cf TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.202(c)).
315. Id. at 541.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 542.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. 282 S.W.3d 519, 522 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. dism'd w.o.j.).




but that the agreement required each party to assume debts in the respec-
tive parties' names, the Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals
found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to hold the hus-
band solely responsible for the debt.323 "Moreover, [the mother] testified
that if the loans were not repaid, the debt would be taken out of [the
husband's] inheritance. '324 Thus, the trial court reasonably concluded
that the loans were made only to the husband.325
The husband also contended that the trial court had failed to make a
"just and right" division of the marital property.32 6 The husband's con-
tention on appeal that the lack of explanation as to how the divorce de-
cree differed from the settlement agreement failed to show evidence of
his repudiation or objection to the agreement.327
In response to the husband's complaint that the trial court did not al-
low a reasonable time for review of the final decree proposed by the wife,
the court of appeals reviewed the transcript of an exchange discussing
when documents were presented. 328 The court of appeals found that no-
where in the record had the husband or his attorney established when
they received the proposed judgment from the wife's attorney. 329 Ac-
cordingly, the trial court had not failed to offer the husband "a reasona-
ble time to review the proposed decree before it entered its order. '330
Finally, in Swaab, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's require-
ment for the parties to attempt mediation.331 The husband argued that
the trial court exceeded its authority in mandating mediation. 332 On ap-
peal however, the divorce decree was found to require an "attempt to
mediate" and was found to be within the trial court's power to order. 333
On appeal in Knight v. Knight,334 the former wife in an informal mar-
riage contended on appeal "that the trial court failed to factor in [a]
$65,000 home equity loan in its valuation" against the community as-
sets.335 Although originally purchased by the couple in 1995, the former
husband "deeded 100% of his interest in the property to [his former wife]
via a special warranty deed" in 1999. And "[i]n 2006, [she] borrowed
$65,000 and granted a home equity lien against the.., property to secure
the loan." The trial court found that "[the former husband] had gifted
the ... property to his [former wife]" by conveying all of his interest to
323. Id. at 527-28.
324. Id. at 528.
325. See id.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 528-29.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 530.
331. Id. at 532.
332. Id. at 531.
333. Id. at 531-32.
334. Knight v. Knight, 301 S.W.3d 723, 723 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no
pet.).
335. Id. at 732.
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her, and thus the $65,000 loan was her separate property.336 The Hous-
ton Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's assessment but
found that the trial court nonetheless "fail[ed] to factor in the debt in its
valuation of the... property ... [since] the court valued the ... property
at $72,383.00 without considering the outstanding $65,000 loan. ' 337 Be-
cause the value of the wife's separate estate was reduced by two-thirds
when the loan was taken into account, the trial court erred in its determi-
nation of a just and right division of the community estate. 338
Because "[p]roceeds of an insurance policy are by statutory definition
nontestamentary in nature," 339 a personal representative of the estate
does not have standing to pursue a claim on behalf of the estate or him-
self when neither is a named beneficiary of the policy.340 In Irwin v. Ir-
win,341 the San Antonio Court of Appeals reversed a trial court's
summary judgment which had granted the decedent's estate a construc-
tive trust over all life insurance proceeds received by the decedent's ex-
wife in a policy that named her as a beneficiary. 342 Although the divorce
decree entered into between the decedent and his ex-wife provided that
he was to be awarded "any and all policies insuring his life," and even
though the decedent had stated in his will that it was his "specific intent
not to provide" for his ex-wife, he had "never changed the designation of
his life insurance beneficiaries. '343 The court of appeals therefore found
that the trial court had erred in providing the estate a claim to the
proceeds. 344
In affirming the trial court's division of assets in Leax v. Leax,3 4 5 the
Houston First District Court of Appeals found that, although the record
supported the wife's argument that she had a lower potential for future
earning than the husband due to a disability, the trial court might con-
sider the wife's fraud and fault when ordering an unequal division of the
community property.346 Although seemingly routine in its division of the
marital estate, the court of appeals in Leax was "unable to find any cases
from Texas courts specifically articulating the proof necessary to warrant
annulling a marriage on the basis of fraud. '347 Decisions from other ju-
risdictions have generally "held that marriages can be annulled on the




339. Tramel v. Estate of Billings, 699 S.W.2d 259, 262 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985,
no writ).
340. Irwin v. Irwin, 307 S.W.3d 383, 385-86 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2009, pet.
denied).
341. Id. at 383.
342. Id. at 384-85.
343. Id. at 384.
344. Id. at 386.
345. Leax v. Leax, 305 S.W.3d 22, 25 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet.
denied).
346. Id. at 34-35.
347. See id. at 29.
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riage. '' 348 Although "[s]everal courts have held that the nondisclosure of
a prior marriage and divorce does not qualify as an extreme enough fraud
to annul a marriage," 349 in Leax, the husband found out that his wife had
previously been married eight times only after she initiated a suit for di-
vorce. 350 The husband testified that prior to marrying her, the wife "told
him that she had only been married [three times]" before.351 Even
though the wife had told him about the three previous marriages, the
husband testified "that if he had known [that she] had actually been mar-
ried eight times previously, he would not have married her."'352 The court
of appeals found that the wife's concealment of five previous marriages
was "extreme" and that it was "sufficient to justify annulment based on
[the wife's] use of fraud 'to induce [the husband] to enter into the mar-
riage' under section 6.107 of the Family Code. ' 353
The Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act (USFSPA)
"provides state courts the authority to treat 'disposable retired pay' as
community property. '354 The United States Supreme Court has held,
however, that USFSPA bars state courts from treating military retirement
pay that has been waived to receive VA disability benefits as property
divisible upon divorce. 355 Moreover, Texas courts have held that "only
military disability pay that was an earned property right can be divided
upon divorce. '356 The Texas Supreme Court has held that VA "disability
benefits are is not an earned property right. '357 Further, "a divorce de-
cree cannot restrict a service member's future right to waive retirement
and elect disability Veteran's Administration benefits. '358 Thus, even a
spouse's "military retirement pay, even after it is a vested right and [is
therefore] part of the community, is subject to defeasance." 359
In Hagen v. Hagen, the ex-wife nevertheless argued that at the time
that the final decree of divorce was entered in 1976, Texas courts had
regarded disability pay as an earned property right.360 The ex-wife also
argued that the ex-husband's post-divorce election to waive military re-
tirement pay in favor of receiving VA disability benefits amounted to a
collateral attack on the decree and was barred by res judicata. 361
348. Id. at 29-30 (citing numerous cases in which fraud was found to affect the essential
nature of the marriage).
349. Id. at 30.
350. Id. at 25.
351. Id. at 30.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 31.
354. Hagen v. Hagen, 282 S.W.3d 899, 901 n.1 (Tex. 2009); see 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1)
(2006).
355. Id. (citing Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 594-95 (1989)).
356. Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551, 552-53 (Tex. 1970); Dominey v. Dominey, 481
S.W.2d 473, 474 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1972, no writ); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 474 S.W.2d
939, 940-41 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1971, writ dism'd).
357. Hagen, 282 S.W.3d at 903.
358. Gillin v. Gillin, 307 S.W.3d 395, 398 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2009, no pet.).
359. Id.
360. Hagen, 282 S.W.3d at 903.
361. Id.
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In Hagen, the trial court had awarded the wife "[o]ne-half of 18/20ths
of all Army Retirement Pay or Retirement Military Pay."'362 The decree
made no mention of VA disability compensation. 363 Because the decree
did not define "Army Retirement Pay" or "Military Retirement Pay," the
supreme court was left to interpret the decree based on the plain meaning
of the words used.364 Thus, the supreme court examined whether, at the
time the decree was entered, military retirement pay included VA disabil-
ity compensation. 365 The supreme court began by noting that in 1976,
federal law provided two means by which a former service member could
receive disability-related compensation: retirement pay for a physical dis-
ability under Title 10 of the United States Code (USC) and VA disability
compensation under Title 38.366 Under Title 10, if a member meets the
requirements for disability, the member can be placed in retirement sta-
tus with "retired pay."'367 Title 38, on the other hand, does not retire the
member but compensates the member for a disability as a result of his
service.368 Thus, unlike military disability pay, "VA disability benefits
were characterized as a gratuity based upon a service-connected disability
rather than an earned property right based upon years of service. 369
In analyzing the ex-wife's contention that the ex-husband's post-di-
vorce election to waive military retirement pay in favor of VA disability
pay was a collateral attack on the decree, the Texas Supreme Court stated
that "asserting the USFSPA as justification for violating provisions of a
final divorce decree could constitute a collateral attack under some cir-
cumstances. '370 However, under the circumstances of Hagen, the su-
preme court found that, rather than making an assertion that required the
decree to be altered or modified, the husband sought enforcement of the
specific language used in the decree, which was not barred by res judicata
or inconsistent with the Texas Family Code.371 Relying on precedent, the
supreme court distinguished between decrees in which the non-service
member spouse was awarded a portion of the service member spouse's
gross retirement or disability benefits from decrees in which the literal
language used only pertained to a portion of the service member's retire-
362. Id. at 901 (emphasis added).
363. Id. at 906.
364. Id. at 902.
365. Id. at 902-03.
366. Id.; see Act of 1956, ch. 61, 70A Stat. 91 (current version codified as amended at 10
U.S.C. § 1201 (2006)) (armed forces); Act of Sept. 2, 1958, subch. II, 72 Stat. 1119 (current
version codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 1110 (2006)) (veterans' benefits).
367. Hagen, 282 S.W.3d at 902.
368. Id. at 903; see Ramsey v. Ramsey, 474 S.W.2d 939, 941 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1971, writ dism'd).
369. Hagen, 282 S.W.3d at 903 (citing Ramsey, 474 S.W.2d at 941); see also Milliken v.
Gleason, 332 F.2d 122, 123 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1002 (1965) (holding that
because the payment of VA disability compensation is at the discretion of the United
States Congress, such compensation is not considered property).
370. Id. at 903-04.
371. Id.; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.006-.007 (a trial court may not modify or amend
the substantive division of property set out in a final decree but may construe and clarify a
decree to achieve proper enforcement).
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ment pay.372 For instance, in Baxter v. Ruddle, the decree specifically
referenced and divided gross retirement benefits and VA disability bene-
fits. 373 The husband remained in the service after the divorce and later
failed to pay his former wife the percentage, provided for in the divorce
decree, in proportion to the growth of the amount he received after the
divorce. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Texas held that the trial
court erred when it determined that the wife was only entitled to a per-
centage valued at the time of divorce.374 Similarly in Berry v. Berry, the
wife was awarded 25 % of the husband's gross pay, not net pay.375 When
the husband "later elected to accept VA disability benefits .... [t]he wife
began receiving a percentage of the reduced retirement pay and sought to
enforce the decree's literal language that awarded her a portion of the
husband's gross retirement pay. ' 376 The trial court found that "the wife
was [only] entitled to a twenty-five percent of the husband's net ... disa-
bility pay," and "[t]he court of appeals affirmed. '377 On final review, the
Texas Supreme Court held that the decree should be enforced according
to its literal language, and unless the decree was void, "the subsequent
adoption of the USFSPA cannot be used to collaterally attack the...
final divorce decree. '378 Thus, the wife was entitled to "a percentage of
what she proved was the husband's gross retirement pay. '379 In Jones v.
Jones,380 the San Antonio Court of Appeals similarly held that a hus-
band's "attempt to apply the USFSPA to alter the substantive provisions
of the (divorce) decree" amounted to a collateral attack on the "unap-
pealed decree. '381 As in Berry, "the decree was enforced according to its
original language. '382
Unlike the approach in Baxter, Berry, and Jones, the ex-husband in
Hagen was not attempting to modify, alter, or change the prior final de-
cree's provisions. 383 "Only an attempt to judicially alter or change the
substantive provisions of a final decree constitutes a prohibited collateral
attack. '384 As previously noted, "military pay" is not and does not in-
clude VA disability pay.385 "The literal language employed [by the de-
cree] does not specify division of gross military pay. ' 386 Nor does the
decree "specify a division of VA disability benefits. '387
372. Hagen, 282 S.W.3d at 903-06.
373. Id. at 903-04; see Baxter v. Ruddle, 794 S.W.2d 761, 762-63 (Tex. 1990).
374. Hagen, 282 S.W.3d. at 904.
375. Id. at 904-05; see Berry v. Berry, 780 S.W.2d 846, 849-50 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1989), rev'd per curiam, 786 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1990).
376. Hagen, 282 S.W.3d at 904.
377. Id. at 905.
378. Id. at 904-05.
379. Id.
380. 900 S.W.2d 786, 789 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, writ denied).
381. Hagen, 282 S.W.3d at 905.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id.; see Reiss v. Reiss, 118 S.W.3d 439, 442 (Tex. 2003).
385. Hagen, 282 S.W.3d at 905-06.
386. Id. at 906 (emphasis added).
387. Id.
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Contrary to the dissenting judge's view that the decree in Berry divided
VA disability benefits, the supreme court again focused on the literal lan-
guage employed and held that because the decree in Berry stated that the
wife was to receive "the gross amount thereof before any deductions," VA
disability was not divided.388 The ex-wife simply received her community
share of the ex-husband's retirement pay before the VA disability offset
the husband's amount. 389 Therefore, the trial court in Berry was merely
clarifying the decree and enforcing it as written. 39° The decree in Hagen,
on the other hand, did not specifically address or compute the ex-wife's
amount based on any similar computations of the husband's gross pay.39 1
Although the dissent urged that Berry should be overruled in order to
address the issue of VA disability properly, the majority concluded Berry
did not divide VA disability benefits and therefore Berry should not be
overruled. 392
Similar to the VA benefits at issue in Hagen, Combat-Related Special
Compensation (CRSC) is statutorily defined as different from retired pay
and may be received in lieu of full retirement pay.393 In Sharp v. Sharp,
the former husband had applied for and had begun to receive CRSC that
reduced the former wife's share of the ex-husband's retirement benefits
"substantially. '394 In her motion to enforce and clarify the decree, the
ex-wife alleged that such an election violated the terms of the decree by
reducing her share of the husband's military retired pay.395 On appeal,
she did not dispute that the husband, whose disability was calculated at
100%, was entitled to receive CRSC in lieu of retirement pay.396 She
argued, however, that such an election "obligated [her husband] to reim-
burse her for her loss."'397 Much like the divorce decree in Hagen, the
decree in Sharp only awarded the wife "a percentage of [the husband's]
military retirement pay if, as, and when he received it.' '398 "The statute
[authorizing CRSC] specifically states that 'payments under [the statute]
are not retired pay." 399 Because the decree in Sharp only awarded the
wife military retirement pay, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that
the decree was unambiguous. 400 Despite the inequity worked on the ex-
wife, the language used in the divorce decrees had to be read literally
because there is a presumption that the divorce court chooses its words
carefully.401
388. Id. at 906-07.
389. Id. at 906.
390. Id. at 907.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 907-08.
393. 10 U.S.C. § 1413a(g) (2006).










The Edinburg Court of Appeals in Thomas v. Piorkowski40 2 reversed
the trial court's clarification order by which the former wife was awarded
a portion of the ex-husband's disability benefits based on a final divorce
decree's calculation of "disposable pay. ' 40 3 Although both cases in-
volved similar resolutions of the language used in the decree which di-
vided the husband's service-related retirement pay, the circumstances at
issue in Thomas were quite different from those in Hagen. The former
husband, in Thomas, had not made a voluntary election to reduce the
amount of retirement pay awarded to the wife in the divorce decree.
Thomas and Piorkowski had been divorced in 2004.404 The divorce de-
cree had awarded Piorkowski, the former wife, 50% of Thomas's disposa-
ble retired pay accrued between May 25, 1996 and the day the couple
signed the decree.40 5 In 2006, "Thomas was placed on the Temporary
Disability Retirement List (TDRL) ...with a thirty percent disability
rating. '40 6 After "Thomas began receiving benefits [as] computed under
§ 1401,407 . . . Piorkowski sought to recover, as disposable retire[ment]
pay, her share of Thomas's TDRL benefits. '40 8 In clarifying the decree,
the trial court found that the payments that Thomas had received since
being placed on the TDRL were disposable retirement pay.40 9 As previ-
ously noted, however, Thomas did not voluntarily elect to be classified as
retired.410 Nor did he meet the requisite eligibility "for .... retirement
based on longevity" of service. 411 "Thomas was not eligible for any re-
tired pay other than that based on his disability. ' 412 Under USFSPA,
"disposable retired pay" specifically excludes temporary disability bene-
fits. 413 Since Thomas's "gross pay ... was computed using the percentage
of disability on the date he was placed on the TDRL," the entire amount
"was not disposable retired pay4 14 and therefore was not divisible as mar-
ital property. '4 15
C. EX-SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE
A trial court may not order income withholding for alimony payments
pursuant to chapter 8 of the Texas Family Code when the divorce decree
merely restates a party's contractual alimony agreement entered into
402. Thomas v. Piorkowski, 286 S.W.3d 662, 622 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2009, no
pet.).
403. Id. at 665-66.
404. Id. at 664.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. 10 U.S.C. § 1401 (2006).
408. Thomas, 286 S.W.3d at 664.
409. Id. at 664-65.
410. See id. at 666-67.
411. Id. at 667.
412. Id.
413. Id. at 666.
414. Id. at 666-67 (emphasis added) (citing Bullis v. Bullis, 467 S.E.2d 830, 836 (Va. Ct.
App. 1996) (en banc)).
415. Id. at 666.
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prior to entry of the divorce decree. 416 In Kee v. Kee, the parties entered
into a partition or exchange agreement which provided that, if they
should separate, the husband would provide monthly financial support
for the wife and their two children in the amount of $3,400.417 When the
parties divorced, the trial court ordered the husband to pay child support
and alimony in accordance with the agreement.418 Within less than one
year, the wife filed a notice of application for a writ of withholding for the
alimony payments.419 "The associate judge denied the [husband's] mo-
tion to abate" the proceeding, but after appealing to the district court,
"[t]he trial court terminated the writ of withholding. '42 0 The Dallas
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's termination of the writ and
found that the husband did not have a duty to support the wife beyond
his contractual obligation.421 Rather than making reference to the spe-
cific statutory framework of alimony payments in accordance with chap-
ter 8, the divorce decree simply restated the agreement.422 Moreover, the
decree provided that alimony payments were to be made over a period of
seventeen years-which is a direct violation of the three-year limitation
period set out in chapter 8.423 Thus, the court of appeals found that the
husband's promise to pay alimony created nothing more than a private
debt unenforceable by a writ of withholding. 424
D. ENFORCEMENT
Without decretal language making clear that a party is under order,
agreements incorporated into divorce decrees are enforced only as con-
tractual obligations.425 Obligations that are merely contractual cannot be
enforced by contempt.4 26 For example, the Supreme Court of Texas in In
re Coppock,427 set aside an order of contempt as void "[b]ecause the un-
derlying judgment ... lack[ed] decretal language necessary for enforce-
ment by contempt. '428
"The trial court's final [divorce] decree . . .incorporated a mediated
settlement agreement [that] permanently enjoined [the couple] from
communicating with each other 'in a coarse or offensive manner."' 429
After the ex-wife allegedly violated this provision in telephone and e-mail
416. See McCollough v. McCollough, 212 S.W.3d 638, 648 (Tex. App.-Austin 2006, no
pet.).




421. Id. at 815.
422. Id.
423. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.054 (West 2006).
424. Kee v. Kee, 307 S.W.3d 812, 815-16 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, pet. denied).
425. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 18.
426. See Kee, 307 S.W.3d at 816.
427. 277 S.W.3d 417, 417 (Tex. 2009).
428. Id. at 420.
429. Id. at 418.
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communications, the ex-husband sought to have the decree enforced. 430
"Finding eighty-four separate violations of the decree [by the ex-wife],
the trial court held [her] in contempt."'431
In order to invoke civil contempt in Texas, clear command language
must be used.432 Moreover, "[m]erely incorporating an agreement into
the recitals of a divorce decree, without a mandate from the court, is not
sufficient. '433 The Supreme Court of Texas, in this case, found that the
language of the divorce decree was insufficient to "advise the parties that
refraining from or engaging in the described conduct [was]
mandatory. ' 434 As the supreme court has routinely found, "[w]ithout de-
cretal language making clear that a party is under order, agreements in-
corporated into divorce decrees are enforced only as contractual
obligations. '435 In this case, the judgment stated the agreement was "en-
forceable as a contract," and therefore the parties' "[mere] contractual
[obligations] [were] not ... enforce[able] by contempt." 436
In In re Provine, a couple agreed to incorporate a mediated settlement
agreement into their divorce decree. 437 The agreement stated that any
disputes arising due to performance of the agreement would be settled by
binding arbitration. 438 Post-divorce, the former wife petitioned for en-
forcement of the agreement, contending that her former husband had not
properly performed his obligations pursuant to the property division, as
set forth in their agreement.439 The former husband moved to compel
arbitration according to the arbitration clause in the agreement. 440 The
trial court found that "the mediation and arbitration provisions [were]
merged into the decree of divorce and that post-divorce matters [would]
be determined by the trial [c]ourt." 44 1 The Houston First Court of Ap-
peals reversed 442 and found that under continuing jurisdiction, the trial
court could only enforce or clarify its decree.443 The divorce court's ple-
nary power was not in dispute. 444 Thus, the court of appeals could not
amend, modify, or alter the decree. 4 5 Because the agreement to arbi-
trate any disputes arising from the performance of the divorce decree was
incorporated into the agreement, the court of appeals determined that
the agreement to arbitrate the dispute should be enforced. 446
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 419.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. Id. at 420 (citations omitted).
436. Id. at 419-20.
437. See 312 S.W.3d 824, 826 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.).
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id. at 827-28.
441. Id. at 828.
442. Id. at 831.
443. Id. at 830.
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Id. at 830-31.
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Finding that the agreement "contemplate[d] post-divorce disputes, as it
.. related to the "performance" of the agreement," the former wife's
"claims in her motion to enforce fell within the scope of the agree-
ment."'447 Further, the court of appeals concluded that "the trial court
erred in refusing to compel arbitration of [the] dispute." 448
In Shumate v. Shumate, the trial court ordered the former husband to
transfer certain credit card accounts into his name only and to remove the
former wife's name from those accounts.449 Three months later, the for-
mer wife sought enforcement of the decree and "alleged that the [former
husband] had violated the terms of the decree by failing to pay the
amounts due on the ... credit cards" over a period of five consecutive
months.450 "She requested that [the former husband] be held in con-
tempt, jailed, and fined for the alleged violations" in addition to "a
money judgment for the unpaid balance. '451 "Alleging [that] he was enti-
tled to judgment as a matter of law because there were no genuine issues
of material fact," the former husband filed a motion for summary judg-
ment.452 "He further alleged that the credit card obligations were not
enforceable by contempt. '453 The trial court awarded the former hus-
band's motion for summary judgment. 454 On appeal, the former wife
contended that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment and
that it should have enforced or clarified the decree. 455 In its analysis, the
Amarillo Court of Appeals distinguished this case from situations in
which an order of contempt may be enforced when "a person.. . willfully
disobeys a valid court order" and therefore is "subject to imprisonment
for a prescribed period and until he complies with the order. ' 456 Ex parte
Hall, for example, "involved an order to pay spousal and child support
which is statutorily enforceable by contempt. '457 Moreover, relying on
Article I, § 18 of the Texas Constitution, the court of appeals distin-
guished this case from "situations [in which the] specific funds to pay the
debt existed, or where particular community property from which the
debt was to be paid was specified. '458 Because the spouse holding the
property would become a constructive trustee, the "failure to surrender
that property pursuant to the divorce decree would be enforceable by
contempt because it is not considered payment of a debt.
459
This case, however, involved a failure to pay debts owed to third-party
creditors in which the funds to be used were not specified in the divorce
447. Id. at 831.
448. Id.
449. 310 S.W.3d 149, 150 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2010, no pet.).






456. Id. at 152.
457. Id. (citing Ex Parte Hall, 854 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. 1993)).
458. Shumate, 310 S.W.3d at 152. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 18.
459. Id. at 153.
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decree.460 "Without identification of existing funds, Appellee is not a
constructive trustee holding property that rightfully belongs to appel-
lant."' 461 Consequently, the appellee's "obligation to make credit card
payments [was] merely a debt owed to [those] companies. '462 The for-
mer husband's failure to meet his credit card obligations, as required by
the divorce decree, did not justify enforcement by contempt.463 Al-
though the divorce decree provided for indemnification, the court of ap-
peals denied the former wife a money judgment because she had failed to
demonstrate that she had actually paid any of the credit card debt.464
In In re Jacobson, the debtor's ex-wife had spent fifteen years seeking
to clarify and obtain the property interests precisely awarded to her in a
final decree of divorce. 465 In 1993, the district court had awarded the ex-
wife a one-half interest of all oil and gas interests of the parties. 466 "A
protracted and bitter dispute arose over the exact property interests
awarded in the . . . [d]ecree. ' 467 From 1993 until 2008, the debtor ex-
husband had prudently believed that his interpretation of the divorce de-
cree was correct because it was supplied by several decisions of the family
court.468 The ex-wife asserted that the debt of approximately $1,200,000
should not be discharged by the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Texas because the ex-husband had breached his fiduciary duty to
her by failing to segregate and protect funds that were ultimately adjudi-
cated to her.469 The ex-wife "relie[d] heavily on [the] Texas Family
Code" to support her conclusion that the ex-husband-debtor breached his
fiduciary duty while holding the funds as a constructive trustee.470 While
the Bankruptcy Code does not define defalcation, "defalcation is broadly
characterized as an abuse of a fiduciary position. '471 Under the Bank-
ruptcy Code, however, the term "fiduciary" is limited to instances involv-
ing express or technical trusts. 472 Thus, a constructive trust will not
suffice to meet the requirements of defalcation. 473 In its examination of
the statutory trust created by the Texas Family Code, the bankruptcy
court concluded that section 9.011(b) imposes only a constructive trust on
property.474 Thus, the wife's reliance on the Family Code was misplaced






465. 433 B.R. 183, 185 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010).
466. Id. at 186.
467. Id.
468. See id. at 186-191.
469. Id. at 185.
470. Id. at 190.
471. Id. at 191.
472. Id. at 191-92.
473. Id. at 194.
474. Id. at 192.
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tion.475 The bankruptcy court concluded that "whatever trust position
the debtor has held does not rise to the level of an express or technical
trust that the Fifth Circuit requires for obtaining a judgment of non-dis-
chargeability ... for defalcation. ' '4 76
In reversing the conclusion of the trial court in Durden v. McClure,477
the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the provision of a divorce
decree in which the ex-wife relinquished her entitlement to federal tax
exemptions for the couple's dependent children was obtained by a con-
sent judgment and not, as the ex-wife contended, as an order of the trial
court.478 Although the federal "tax code allows a parent, who is other-
wise entitled to [a tax] exemption [for his or her dependent children], to
voluntarily relinquish that exemption," 479 a trial court may not order a
"custodial parent 'to release a dependency exemption allocated to her by
the federal government."' 480
In Durden, the parties' 2005 divorce decree provided that in odd-num-
bered years, the ex-husband would claim tax exemptions for two of the
couple's three children, and in even years, the ex-wife would do so. 481
Even though the divorce decree contained a stipulation that "the provi-
sions contained herein are part of a Court Order, and are not contrac-
tual," when read with the entire decree, the San Antonio Court of
Appeals concluded that such a provision would not be inconsistent with a
finding that the parties had entered into a consent judgment.482 The
court of appeals therefore found that this stipulation "merely evidences
the parties' agreement to not seek contractual remedies or defenses to
any future action to enforce the decree. '483
In Hidalgo v. Hidalgo,484 the Supreme Court of Texas held that "a
party who relies on a then-valid procedural argument in the court of ap-
peals [should] be able to assert substantive arguments if [the] Court in-
validates the procedural argument while the case is pending. '485 The
parties in Hidalgo were divorced in California in 2002. The "decree re-
quired [the ex-husband] to obtain life insurance with [the ex-wife] as the
beneficiary. ' 486 In 2005, the former wife sought to enforce the decree in
Texas after the former husband had ceased to pay premiums on his pol-
icy."'487 The ex-husband argued that he was then "retired and no longer
required to carry the policy.
475. Id.
476. Id. at 193.
477. 281 S.W.3d 137, 142 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2008, no pet.).
478. Id.
479. Id. at 140; 26 U.S.C. § 152(e)(2) (2006).
480. Durden, 281 S.W.3d at 139 (citing In the Int. of C.C.N.S., 955 S.W.2d 448, 451 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1997, no pet.)).
481. Id. at 138.
482. Id. at 138, 142.
483. Id. at 142.
484. 310 S.W.3d 887, 887 (Tex. 2010).





What followed were three separate proceedings in which the trial court
entered three orders. The first order (Order 1) "denied [the former
wife's] motion for enforcement of the ... decree [and] state[d] [that the
former husband]" was no longer required to maintain the insurance cov-
erage previously ordered.488 The ex-wife then "filed a motion for rehear-
ing and asked the ... trial court to amend the order" requiring the ex-
husband to resume insurance payments if he returned to work before at-
taining the age of sixty-five. 489 The second order (Order 2), issued
"ninety-one days later, vacated Order 1 and ... directed [the ex-husband]
to pay all [insurance] premiums then due." The supreme court went on
to hold that because the ex-wife sought a substantive change to the first
order, the modification would extend the trial court's plenary power to
vacate the final order under rule 329(b). 490 In effect, Order 2 granted the
ex-wife a new trial.491 Roughly three months later (183 days after Order
1 and 92 days after Order 2), however, the trial court issued its third or-
der (Order 3) in which the trial court set aside Order 2 and reinstated
Order 1 in favor of the ex-husband as its final order.492 The ex-wife ap-
pealed in reliance on Porter v. Vick, which held that a trial court may only
retract a motion for new trial within seventy-five days after a new trial is
granted.493 The ex-wife also filed a writ of mandamus, which the court of
appeals initially granted on its finding that Order 3 was "void because it
was signed outside the time period within which a trial court may revive a
prior judgment by vacating the order granting a new trial."'4 94 While the
case was pending before the court of appeals, however, the Supreme
Court of Texas decided In re Baylor Medical Center at Garland.495 The
supreme court held that "when a new trial is granted, the case stands on
the trial court's docket the same as though no trial had been had ....
Thus a trial court has power to set aside an order granting a motion for
new trial any time before a final judgment is entered. '496 Consequently,
Order 3 was not a void judgment because, under the supreme court's
holding, a trial court may set aside a motion for new trial "any time
before a final judgment is entered. '497 Order 3 thus "constituted a final
order subject to appeal. ' 498 Because the ex-wife's brief with respect to
Order 3 had "made a legally meritorious procedural argument" under the






493. Id. at 889 (citing Porter v. Vick, 888 S.W.2d 789, 789-90 (Tex. 1994) (internal quo-
tations omitted)).
494. Hidalgo, 310 S.W.3d at 889.
495. In re Baylor Med. Ctr. at Garland, 280 S.W.3d 227, 227 (Tex. 2007).
496. Hidalgo, 310 S.W.3d at 899 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Baylor, 280
S.W.3d at 230-31).
497. Id. (emphasis added).
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appeals so that she could put forth her substantive arguments.499
499. Id. at 889-90.
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